The Abbe Marigny's Histoire des arabes sous les califes, Napoleon's immediate source, tells us that Mahadi is indeed just and generous, but omits all mention of his devotion to peace and science. Peace and science: respectful neighbors and accelerating progress: the shrewd reader may surmise that there is a strong defense component in the Caliph's scientific expenditure. The introduction of Hakem, the Masked Prophet, the militant disturber of the peace and opponent of imperial science, is also the first acknowledgement that the Empire actually has parts, that it Borges adds that "the original Rose is lost, for the manuscript found in 1899 and published all too hastily by the Morgenliindisches Archiv has been pronounced a forgery-first by Horn, and afterward by Sir Percy Sykes."
I once had the opportunity of asking Borges about these supposed sources. He candidly admitted that they were, perhaps, bogus. He was even less clear about his true sources, but referred obliquely to an encyclopedia. He did not deny having read Napoleon's story. The conspicuous feature of the sources cited, whether or not they are genuine,2 is that none of them gives a reliable testimony to an actual event. All we have is excerpts from one book (author unnamed), a history which qualifies "Precision" with "Revision," a polemical text that only refutes the missing original work of the prophet-and a few coins which further modify that refutation. For Borges, history is above all a textual phenomenon, embedded in layers of untrustworthy cross-references. Napoleon has essentially the same view: historical truth, he observes to Las Cases, is mostly just "une fable convenue"(2,373).
Borges considerably extends and elaborates Napoleon's version of events by sketching in the hero's premonitory youth, the formative moments of his early career. According to Borges, Hakim, the Masked 2 The sources contain elements of authenticity: for example, one Ahmad ibn Yahya, al-Baladhuri, did write The Origin of the Islamic State. Moreover, at the back of A Universal History of Infamy, Borges is helpful enough to indicate two supposedly genuine sources: A History of Persia by Sir Percy Sykes and Die Vernichtung der Rose, translated from the Arabic by Alexander Schulz (Leipzig, 1927) . The first really exists but offers only a slim paragraph on the Masked Prophet which has little in common with Borges's story; I can find no hard evidence for the existence of the second. Further alternative narratives concerning the Masked Prophet are recorded in Sadighi, Chapter 5, and Browne 1, Prophet, is apprenticed to the trade of dyer, which is condemned as "that art of the ungodly, the counterfeiter and the shifty, which was to inspire him to the first imprecations of his unbridled career" (78). Thus Hakim, ultimately a distortion of historical truth, begins his life as a distortionist: to dye something is (according to Borges's austere narrator) illicit, impious, criminal: deforming the original, it provides an inauthentic gloss on the real, brings an excess into the world-as will Hakim in his subsequent career, described as "pr6diga": overproductive and overly liberal in distribution. The penitent Hakim, who forsakes his vats and cauldrons, is quoted as saying:
Thus did I sin in the days of my youth, tampering with the true colours of God's creation.
The Angel told me that rams were not the colour of tigers, the Satan told me that the Almighty wanted them to be, and that he was availing himself of my skill and my dyestuffs. Now I know that the Angel and the Satan both strayed from the truth, and that all colours are abominable. (78) (79) The prophet, then, repents of dyeing by propounding an extreme form of the pro-authenticity thesis: not only are dyes a deviation from truth, but even the untreated original, by its sheer abundance, can be misleading: color somehow conceals the quiddity of things.
Napoleon makes no mention of dyeing. The diminutive author notes, however, perhaps with a hint of jealousy, that Hakem is "d'une haute stature." Tallness, in Napoleon, is a sort of hubris: the hero is doomed to be cut down to size. Hakem-craftily flattering the over-ambitious masses, in Napoleon's view-preaches egalitarianism. He is a masterly rhetorician-"d'une 61oquence mile et emportee"; but his oral proselytizing is supported by a text: "le texte ordinaire de ses sermons." Thus the underlying conflict becomes clear: Mahadi is a science man, a devotee of high technology, while Hakem is on the arts side, a speaker and a writer.
Just as Napoleon's Hakem is a textualist, so Borges's Hakim is a skilled semiotician. He tells a group of converts that while they merely await the sign of a month of penance-the moon of Ramadan-he is "the preacher of a greater sign-that of a lifetime of penance and a death of martyrdom." The mask is another sign. According to Hakim, the Angel Gabriel cut off his (Hakim's) head and took it to heaven where it was entrusted with the mission of prophesying and endowed with a radiance intolerable to mortal eyes. Thus the mask is there to prevent his followers being blinded by the face beneath it. Hakim claims that "when all men on earth professed the new law, the Face would be revealed to them and they could worship it openly-as the angels already worshipped it." The mask is actually the sign of a forthcoming revelation.
Hakim increases his following and his power. His milita against the Caliph's armies are only reluctantly and obliquel by The Book of Precision and Revision. According to this unr ment, says Borges, "the armies of the Caliph are everywher but as the invariable result of these victories is the remova or the withdrawal from impregnable fortresses, the char surmise actual truth." (The Caliph has good reason to fe according to Marigny, his father was the original man writing on the wall: specifically, verses prophesying hi father eventually died of anxiety over the prophecy, which self-fulfilling.) The story of Hakim is longer than that of Hakem, mor tailed, more humorous. Borges enunciates the basic tenet heretical creed-a philosophy omitted by the briefer N cosmogony boasts a spectral god, "as majestically devoid of name or face," who creates a series of 999 heavens, ea one the image of the one preceding, the first presided shadows of the Creator, the last by a shadow of shadows of shadows, whose "fraction of divinity approaches zero" ( rules this world. Thus according to Hakim, "the world w mistake, a clumsy parody. Mirrors and fatherhood, because tiply and confirm the parody, are abominations." Hell, f deny the Veil and the Face, is roughly similar, but with fla ing of interlocking zones of fire, their number being a pow Heaven seems scarcely more appealing: "Its darkness is n There are fountains and pools made of stone, and the happin heaven is the happiness of leave-taking, of self-denial, and know they are asleep" (84). Earth, in short, consists of r reproduction, Hell of incandescent multiplicity, Heaven of tot Both Hakim's and Hakem's periods of supremacy are Both men are bottled up, beseiged by the forces of the hopelessly outnumbered. The Napoleon text switches to tense at this point, and adopts the prophetic mode. Th narrator bluntly apostrophizes his protagonist: "Hakem, ou tes ennemis vont s'emparer de ta personne!" Napoleon us, by way of response to this ultimatum, an example o Prophet's persuasive speeches-his last: he tells his discip versation with God in which God advises him to dig w around the fortress to trap their enemies. The trenches and filled with lime. Hakem's own men then partake of poi and are dumped in the trenches, while Hakem himself comm by plunging into a vat of flaming acid (Sykes calls it "a tank Only a solitary mistress of Hakem survives to greet the Caliph's troops.
Hakem's motive is connected with another con-trick: by appearing to disappear so completely, his remaining followers in the country will believe that he and his company have been removed safely to heavenand that he will return. Thus, even in death, Hakem has the last word.
Borges alters the Napoleonic denouement decisively. Hakim's end seems to be entirely Borges's invention (unless there is some mention of these events on the barely legible coins unearthed by the Trans-Caspian Railway). According to the later version of the tale, all is well in the fortress and "the arrival of a host of golden angels was imminent," when a rumor (emanating from an adultress in the harem on the brink of execution) spreads among the faithful that the Prophet's right hand is deformed. As he is publicly praying for a sign, two captains tear away the Veil. The Face beneath, the "promised face," is indeed whitebut with the whiteness of leprosy. The gruesome description runs as follows: "There were no brows; the lower lid of the right eye hung over the shrivelled cheek; a heavy cluster of tubercles ate away the lips; the flattened, inhuman nose was like a lion's" (85). Hakim, now as merely cunning as Hakem, attempts a last desperate strategem: "Your unforgivable sins do not permit you to see my splendour," he argues (85); but his argument is cut short as the captains run him through with spears.
The physical illness affecting the Prophet confirms his metaphysical doctrines; retrospectively, it can be seen to inspire them. Not only is the face not god-like, it is scarcely human: the face, like the world according to Hakim, is a clumsy parody, a distortion of the original. Napoleon, with clumsy prematureness, makes this point about halfway through his story; whereas in Borges we do not know until the very end what the mask masks, in Napoleon we learn early on the true motivation of the Prophet's act of self-concealment: "une maladie cruelle, suite des fatigues de la guerre, vint defigurer le visage du prophete. Ce ne fut plus le plus beau des Arabes; ces traits nobles et fiers, ces yeux grands et pleins de feu etaient ddfigures. Hakem devint aveugle" (17). The very defigurer occurs twice in successive sentences to stress (perhaps overstress) the corruption of the original figure. Both Hakem and Hakim are the embodiments of disfiguration, of distortion and deception. Hakem, beginning as a subversive, an antiscientific word-spinner, becomes a full-time deceiver of the gullible masses. Hakim, in turn, never stops being a dyer, a colorer of the facts: his craft is the pervasive symbol of his career: an illusionist, he blinds people to the truth. His ostensible attachment to invisible verities is just a cover.
There is considerable convergence between the dual fa and Hakim. Napoleon's last sentence asks: "Jusqu'oui p fureur de l'illustration?" (19). La fureur de l'illustration: the rity? Surely an inadequate reason for diving into a tub of rewriting enables us to make better sense of the phrase: il after all, illustration, perhaps an allusion to the art of dyein arts. The context reminds us of the word's etymological or of making lustrous, brightening an image, enlightening deceiver, whose mask conceals radiance, remains an arti But Napoleon's penultimate sentence states: "Cet exemp able." Borges gives both more substance and a more alle to Napoleon's point: the key sentence in the conclusio story states that his face appears "so bloated and unbeli the onlookers it seemed a mask" (85). Hakim has, in a s his case. His followers are not yet able to see the truth.
behind the mask, is yet another mask. The revelation has b pointment; but the Prophet warned that secular things are deceptive, that "revulsion is the cardinal virtue" (83). So even in failure Hakim achieves a kind of success, a conf redemption. Perhaps his fate should not be reckoned an happy one.
So much for convergence. But the divergence between the two texts is no less self-evident. Hakem keeps up his deception; Hakim is revealed as a leper. A couple of questions follow from this. First: why do Hakim's own men kill him? Second: why has Borges altered the received outline of the story quite so radically? Numerous answers to the first question present themselves. One is sheer revulsion: Hakim seen in the flesh, maskless, is too monstrous to be allowed to live. Alternatively, his followers might reasonably object to having a leper in their midst (the mystery, indeed, is only how he has managed to get away with it for so long). Again, they may be incensed at the fraud practiced upon them: they kill Hakim not for his ugliness or his disease, but for deceiving them. Probably all these considerations are more or less relevant. As for the second question (why does the story end this way and not another?), further data may facilitate an answer-and perhaps improve the answer to the first.
The story of the masked prophet recurs elsewhere. One of its avatars, referred to by Borges, makes up part of Thomas Moore's Lalla Rookh, published in the dying years of the Napoleonic era. Borges denounces Moore's work as "a long-winded poem . .. laden with all the sentimentality of an Irish patriot" (78). That judgment is not incomprehensible, but there are aspects of the poem which would surely appeal to Borges. The text, borrowing from the Arabian Nights the device of incorporating stories within a story, comprises a number of Orient-inspired poems set within the framework of a prose narrative. In the outer story Lalla Rookh is an Indian princess on her way to meet her appointed and unknown husband-to-be, the King of Bucharia, attended by Fadladeen, the Great Nazir, and an immense cortege. The tedium of the long journey is relieved by a young poet, a rather Byronic youth, who recites poems, the first of which concerns "The Veiled Prophet of Khorasan." In this version, the lone survivor of the massacre, the mistress mentioned by Napoleon, and who in Borges is perhaps the origin of the rumor about Hakim's hand, plays a more prominent part. Omitted by both Napoleon and Borges, a young hero joins the followers of the Prophet and turns out to be an old flame of the heroine. The poem is conveniently summed up for us by Fadladeen, who is not just the Great Nazir but also chief critic:
The chief personages of the story were, if he rightly remembered them, an ill-favoured gentleman with a veil over his face; a young lady, whose reason went and came, according as it suited the poet's convenience to be sensible or otherwise; and a youth ... who took the aforesaid gentleman in a veil for a Divinity. "From such materials," said he, "what can be expected?" After rivalling each other in long speeches and absurdities, through some thousands of lines as indigestible as the filberts of Berdaa, our friend in the veil jumps into a tub of aquafortis; the young lady dies in a set speech, whose only recommendation is that it is her last; and the lover lives on to a good old age, for the laudable purpose of seeing her ghost, which he at last happily accomplishes, and expires. This you will allow is a fair summary of the story, and if Nasser, the Arabian merchant, told no better, our Holy Prophet (to whom be all honour and glory!) had no need to be jealous of his abilities for story-telling. (230) The last line of this exegesis provides a clue to the meaning of the whole story. Nasser, the Arabian merchant and trader in Arabian tales, is clearly a high-class storyteller, of whom the Holy Prophet-Muhammad-is, or should be, jealous. The comment reveals the hand of an infidel: the founder of Islam, inspired by Allah himself, was concerned to distinguish himself from mere storytellers, poets, and the like (with which his opponents attempted to identify him); so he has no grounds for jealousy of the merchant. But, in any case, he certainly would have no need to be jealous with respect to the story of the Veiled Prophet of Khorasan. Why not? Partly, no doubt, because of the quality of the writing: thus it offers no competition to the Qur'an; but partly also, perhaps, because of the quality of the rival prophet. The key point about Moore's Masked Prophet is that he is, from the start, a full-time delinquent, an impostor, an evil man masquerading as an angel. He too promises a future revelation, in a time when Truth alone speaks, Mind reigns, and Man is holy: But the reader is never intended to take him seriously. He is, quite explicitly, a False Prophet; he cannot be a rival to Muhammad. Gods, in general, are intolerant of rival gods; and the same principle seems to apply to prophets, the mouthpieces of gods.
Muhammad, in the Qur'an, is generously accommodating towards prophets of the past, notably Moses and Jesus. They were true prophets but Christians and Jews have since strayed from the truth. This interpretation of history is succinctly outlined in a verse from the second chapter of the Qur'mn: Mankind were one community, then they differed among themselves, so Allah raised prophets as bearers of good tidings and as warners, and sent down with them the Book containing the truth that he might judge between the people wherein they differed. But then they began to differ about the book, and none differed about it except those to whom it was given, after clear signs had come to them, out of envy towards one another.4
The function of the Prophet, Muhammad, and the Qur'an, the Book, is (like that of Napoleon's egalitarian Hakem) to put an end to these differences once and for all, to provide a definitive text beyond interpretation, and thus misinterpretation and distortion.
The point about the Qur'an (noted by Napoleon and Borges) is that the Mother of the Book is deposited in heaven: the Qur'dn is the transcript of a tablet revealed to the prophet by the Angel Gabriel. In "On the Cult of Books" Borges quotes Muhammad al-Ghazali, a commentator on the Qur'in, as saying: "The Koran is copied in a book, is pronounced with the tongue, is remembered in the heart, and, even so, continues to persist in the centre of God and is not altered by its passage through written pages and human understanding" (118). The Book is or should be inalterable. Tinkering with the text amounts to blasphemy and heresy. This attitude leads to paranoia of the text.
Another prophetic and paranoid text is the Book of the Apocalypse.
In Revelation 22:18-19, Saint John the Divine declares:
For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, if any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written 4 Farid's edition. The italicized passages are italicized in the translation. in this book: And if any man shall take away from the words of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city and from the things which are written in this book.
Authority derives from integrity. The Bible rests its claim to be the word of God on its claim to pronounce the first and the last word on everything, to describe both the beginning and the end of Creation, genesis and apocalypse. The fear of alteration, of being added to or subtracted from, may be occasioned not just by editorial adjustments but by alternative books. Hence perhaps the plague visited upon the Masked Prophet: the curse of some prior prophet. For Hakim alMokanna, like other prophets before him, also claims to be the final (and supreme) incarnation of the Divine Spirit.5
It is in this context that book-burning becomes commonplace and inevitable. Borges and Napoleon-and likewise Jules Verne-refer to the fate of the library at Alexandria. Napoleon, in his notes on Marigny, notes that the Caliph Omar, who presides over the canonical ordering of the Qur'an, states that: "Ou ce que contiennent les livres [de la bibliotheque] s'accorde avec le livre de Dieu ou il ne s'y accorde pas. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, il faut les detruire" (Masson and Biagi 2,5). Thus the 700,000 volumes, Napoleon records, were distributed to the various city baths to serve as fuel for heating the water.
St. Paul's objective in his First Epistle to the Corinthians is somewhat similar. Corinth is an embarrassment because there are just too many prophets in that city. Every other Corinthian thinks he or she is a prophet, has a personal hot-line to God. By way of cutting down numbers, Paul draws a distinction between glossolalia, speaking in (or with) tongues, and prophecy (1 Cor. 14). Paul rates speaking in tongues rather low. The key thing about glossolalia is that no one can make head or tail of it, unless there is an "interpreter" on hand. Paul insists on the "clear signs," similar to those mentioned in the Qur'an and invoked by Hakim: words must be easily understood, eusemos, literally, "well-signifying" (14:9). Speaking in tongues does not give an eusemos logos, says Paul, but prophecy does. The Prophet has no need of an interpreter: his signs are already clear. And clarity is a sign of truth. But what happens when two or three prophets are gathered together, and they all produce the eusemos logos, but happen to disagree? Say one prophet prophesies a plague of locusts if the people don't mend their ways, and another forecasts frogs. Which is right? All well-signifying words are good, but some, clearly, are better than others. "God," says peace" (14:33). So what Paul seeks to achieve is a sing doctrine all can agree on. What Paul recommends is as f the prophets speak two or three, and let the other judge
What the other (whoever he may be) has to judge is wheth the prophet is a true prophet. But how do you tell the differ a true prophet and a false one? One way, of course, is to whether, if the people don't mend their ways, they are locusts or frogs. But matters are rarely this simple. Prophe necessarily entail prediction. A pro-phitis can be one who sp in front of, for (on behalf of), as well as one who speak advance of the event (as in prognosis); a prophet is thus, mo a revealer of truth. One early Christian text, Hermas the She that the true prophet is "full with the Spirit," and the f "empty." A more practical formula is recommended by (one of the early Christian texts that didn't make it in Testament). Reflecting the practices of small, and pres pecunious, rural communities of first century Syria-Palesti that: "Any apostle that stays more than three days, or acce more than bed and board, or asks for money, is a 'false pro similarly, "If a prophet order a meal in the Spirit, well a if he eats the meal, he is a false prophet."6 In the same spir depicts the false prophet as an exponent of free enterprise, what the market demands, giving answers tailored to meet of clients. The Veiled Prophet in Moore's version of the tale defends this kind of entrepreneurial prophet:
That prophet ill sustains his holy call Who finds not heav'ns to suit the tastes of all; Houris for boys, omniscience for sages, And wings and glories for all ranks and ages. (186) Paul himself, of course, is a prophet, and the first duty he assigns "the others" is to certify him as a true prophet, to "acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord" (14:37). Thus his second-order, meta-prophetic discourse is elevated into first-order Scripture. Paul's implicit or sometimes explicit formula for differentiating the true prophet from the false prophet is whether or not he agrees with Paul. Such is the final implication of the eusimos logos: conformity with the canon.
But although Paul is a prophet and relates prophecy to omniscience, it seems as if prophecy is doomed to be displaced. Paul looks forward 6 These examples are taken from Aune 197, 225. to a time when prophecy, tongues, knowledge are no more: "Charity never faileth," he declares in 1 Cor 13:8-10:
but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues they shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. For we know in part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.
"That which is perfect" is shorter in the original Greek: to teleion, complete, finished, at an end: it already contains the idea of the abolition of its opposite, to ek merous, the partial, the incomplete. There is a compulsion, in prophecy, to seek the teleion, to fill in the gaps and complete the picture: to put an end to other prophecies. The eschatological character of prophecy reflects the desire to annihilate the competition.
This tension between the partial and the total enables me, at last, to consider the case ofJules Verne. Verne has been the hidden subject of most of my propositions so far, masked by the deceptive identities of Napoleon and Borges, Muhammad and St. Paul. But it seems only appropriate, in this context, to remove the mask.
Verne's heroes are typically preoccupied by the teleion, depressed with incompleteness and obsessed with completion. The same seems to be true of Verne himself, who observed in an interview in English that:
It is my intention to complete, before my working days are done, a series which shall include, in story form, my whole survey of the world's surface and heavens; there are still left corners of the world to which my thoughts have not yet penetrated. As you know, I have dealt with the moon, but a great deal remains to be done, and if health and strength permit me, I hope to finish the task. (Belloc 213) It seems, unfortunately, that Verne's oeuvre, though immense, neglected to include the story of the masked prophet. However, there is certainly no shortage of prophets in Verne. And what is true of several of them is that their identities are obscure. They hide behind implausible names. This is true of two in particular: most famously, Captain Nemo, inventor and commander of the submarine Nautilus, who figures in Vingt mille lieues sous les mers and L'Ile mystirieuse; and Robur, the master of heavier-than-air flying machines and protagonist of Robur-le-Conquirant and Maiztre du monde. Robur remains a permanent enigma, his origins and nationality obscure, while the biography of Nemo is only revealed at the very end of L'Ile mysterieuse, where he turns out to be an Indian prince, hostile to British imperialism. And what is true of these characters is also true of their machines: they are shrouded in mystery. Hence this dialogue concerning the electrically-powered Nautilus: Question: how do you enhance the motive force of electricity enough to power a full-scale submarine? Answer: a cunning system of levers. I Conquirant, the Albatros is kept aloft by batteries and mys cumulators" designed to increase almost to infinity the ava ment of energy. But how does it work? "C'est le secret d 73).7 Verne observes that Robur has cunningly declined patent on his device, thus leaving everyone in the dark. Bot and machine owe their power, in part, to their incogn capacity for dissimulation. When the mask is dropped-a of Nemo-the masked man dies.
Both Nemo and Robur are outlaws. Nemo is a self-professed misan thrope who goes about sinking ships; Robur kidnaps rival aeronaut balloonists, to demonstrate the superiority of his vehicle over thei Both, like Hakem, are disturbers of the peace; both are considere subversives, and hunted by the forces of law and order. But the truth about these supposed rebels is that they are ultimately more conservative than their pursuers. Each foresees and seeks to bring about a futu technologically more advanced than the present alluded to by Vern But each, in the last analysis, champions technological stasis. Nemo having invented the Nautilus, cuts himself off from landlubbing human ity, attempts to blow all other seagoing vehicles out of the water, and maroons himself within the precincts of his on-board library an museum. His Qur'5nic fantasy is that his library is complete: "qu l'Humanit6 n'a plus ni pens6 ni ecrit" (Vingt mille lieues I, xi, 98). T closing epitaph pronounced on the expiring Nemo by a passing sava condemns him for being an obstacle to progress. Similarly, Robur seek to invent a machine which will be the last word in aeronautical engineer ing, a grand synthesis of all technical possibilities. Again, if he has his way, no more will be thought or written on the subject. The balloonist faction is naturally hostile to Robur because, as far as they are co cerned, the balloon is already the last word-it's just a question of building a better balloon. Both Nemo and Robur, then, seek to monopolize the future. In effect, they are hard-line realists; they want reality to correspond to their blueprints. We know that realism implies anteriority: something must already have existed for the text (image etc.) to record and correspond to. What Verne shows is that the dedicated realist also requires a firm grip on posteriority: you must keep an eye on the future if reality is not to step out of line with your descriptions.
The ideal of the superficially radical Vernian prophet is actually a condition of fixity which will permanently abolish the future in favor of a protracted present, thus rendering prophecy redundant. Again the prophet abhors prophecy: he aspires to finality, to the annihilation of prophecy, to the creation of a canon which cannot be added to or subtracted from.
Vernian narrative, despite its proliferating prophets, is typically rather reticent about the future. Verne himself seems reluctant to add to the sum of the dejai-vu, to fear supplementary revelation. His texts try to go one better than their prophetic characters, who only look forward to bringing matters to a decisive end, sealing off the present from the future, eliminating prophets and bringing history to a stop.
Prophets invariably come to a bad end.
Verne was not, contrary to popular belief, impatient for the future. One of his public speeches, for example, is devoted to a spirited denunciation of the bicycle. He contrasts his own and H. G. Wells's techniques for getting people to the moon-both highly improbable-and concludes: "I make use of physics. He invents" (Sherard 59) . Invention for Verne is tantamount to mendacity. Imagination, fantasy must be rigorously suppressed. He anticipates the future anticipated by his prophets by confining himself strictly to commentary on existing texts, notably scientific ones. The slightly embarrassed introduction of any seemingly new-fangled machinery is invariably prefaced by a longwinded assurance that it is really only an updated version of a device known to the ancients, that it is preceded by an honorable tradition, and it is supported by scientific documentation-with references and footnotes supplied.
To the spectacular and doomed form of prophecy by inspiration and invention, the Vernian narrative thus opposes an alternative mode: the prophecy of interpretation. This seems to mark a reversion to the Greek concept of prophecy that Paul rejected: the prophet as an interpreter of another's words, prophecy as second-order discourse. But Verne takes the prophet out of the cave of oracular utterance, out of the laboratory, the modern Delphi, and installs him in the library. The prophet is no longer in touch with the gods but only a reader and writer. While the outlawed hi-tech prophet seeks to impose a rule-bound closed system, the interpretative prophet, the text-bound exponent of tradition, is actually more radical in that he leaves the future open. If there is no first word, the original logos tou theou, then neither is there any last word.
The end of Robur-le-Conquirant presents an emblematic scene in which Robur at last reveals himself and his machine to the masses, but then departs without revealing the secret of its mysterious power: "Je pars donc," he declares, "et j'emporte mon secret avec moi" (xviii, 257). The theory espoused by the Masked Prophet entails the elimination of differences, the acquisition of perfect knowledge. He advocates and seeks to embody a Pauline ideal of prophecy: utterances of pure intelligibility, whose meaning or force (dunamis) (1 Cor 14:11) is irresistible, compulsory; coherent statements, emblems of an empire of apodictic truth-alluded to by Napoleon and Robur-safe from subversion, beyond contradiction. But his practice collapses into deceit and distortion: the mask is the symbol of duplicity, not the prelude to disclosure. His doctrines, after all, are not, as Borges notes, a privileged communication from God but only an adaptation of old Gnostic beliefs. The entire story, likewise, is an example of "falsifying and distorting . . . the ideas of others," as Borges confesses in the preface (Infamy 12). The text is always a potential or actual impostor. In Paul's terms, it is closer to glossolalia than to true prophecy. Speaking in tongues, says Paul, is a sign for unbelievers. And these stories invite disbelief; as Napoleon remarks: "cet exemple est incroyable." In none of them is the logos entirely eusemos: like the tongues, like any actual prophecy, like signs, they allow or encourage interpretation.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, I might hazard a provisional hypothesis: namely, that there is a secret affinity between prophecy (especially the masked variety) and literature. Certainly the Greeks acknowledged some kinship between the mantic and the bardic arts by referring to the poet as "the prophet of the Muses" (Socrates, for example, maintains in The Apology that poets, like prophets, rely on inspiration-not wisdom-for their work). Turning to prose, why, in Moore's Lalla Rookh, should the holy prophet be jealous of Nasser the Arabian merchant's stories unless narrative is prophetic, containing the promise to tell what happens next? In that same text, the Indian princess, still on her way to meet her appointed husband, the King of Bucharia, inevitably falls for the dashing young poet, Feramorz. Grieving and reluctant, she finally arrives at her destination, where the youthful King turns out to be none other than Feramorz himself, who had only been passing himself off as a lowly poet. Thus the poet too, like the subversive, prophetic, veiled subject of his opening poem, has been wearing a mask.
Perhaps this revelation is only accidental and trivial, but it also tells us something about criticism. The news that the poet is, after all, a king, causes a change of heart in the critic and Great Nazir, Fadladeen.
His earlier critical assessment concludes:
Not withstanding the observations which I have thought it my duty to make, it is by no means my wish to discourage the young man:-so far from it indeed, that if he will but totally alter his style of writing and thinking, I have very little doubt I shall be vastly pleased with him. (23) Apprised of the true royal identity of the poet, the critic recants and is "seized with an admiration of the King's verses as unbounded as, he begged him to believe, it was disinterested" (338). The critic, then, also wears a mask: perhaps he too only promises the imminence of a revelation which does not occur. . "On the Cult of Books." Other Inquisitions. Trans. Ruth L. C. Simms. London: Souvenir, 1973. 
